ABSTRACT
This chapter is about the distinction between sense and nonsense, or more strictly the distinction between truth-valued propositions and nonsensical pseudo-propositions, in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Two questions that are raised are whether “truth-valued” in “truth-valued propositions” is pleonastic and whether “nonsensical” in “nonsensical pseudo-propositions” is pleonastic. Neither question, it is conceded, has much exegetical or philosophical significance. But there is an associated question that does, namely, whether we have any understanding of what it is for something to be a pseudo-proposition without a truth-value independently of what it is for something to be a proposition with one. It is urged that, for Wittgenstein, we do not: a pseudo-proposition without a truth-value is an item that appears, falsely, to be a proposition with one. In an appendix the question is raised whether Kant would have done well to say something similar about empty thoughts.
