ABSTRACT
Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) and Taiwan are likely to remain latent nuclear powers for the foreseeable future. This conclusion presents some closing thoughts on the concepts discussed in the previous chapters of this book. All three cases explored in this book have a deep nuclear history. Their civilian nuclear programmes and development of several dual-use technologies would enable them to produce nuclear weapons in perhaps two years or less in Japan's case in the unlikely event that they were to abandon their firm adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Two final considerations are warranted concerning the Korean Peninsula. Firstly, North Korea cannot be accepted as a nuclear-armed state. Its international interlocutors must instead continue always to insist on denuclearisation and to mean it. Secondly, in the event of the wild-card scenario of North Korean collapse, it will be imperative to ensure that all of Pyongyang's nuclear-weapons infrastructure is removed or destroyed.
