ABSTRACT
By deposing Saddam Hussein, the United States radically altered the balance of power in the Persian Gulf. Since the early 1940s, power had been dispersed
among Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United States, Iran and the Soviet Union (and its successor, the Russian Federation). The most intense manoeuvring within this multipolar balance occurred between Iraq and Iran, with neither side achieving a clear advantage. That dynamic has now changed. Even before the US-led 2003
invasion of Iraq, Iran possessed a budding nuclear programme, the region’s largest population, an expansive ballistic-missile arsenal and, through sponsorship, influence over the Lebanese Shia group Hizbullah. The George W. Bush
administration and neo-conservative proponents of the war overlooked these assets, and America’s removal of Saddam Hussein as the principal strategic counterweight to Iran paved the way for an expansion of Iran’s influence. The
United States now faces the question of how it can mitigate potential threats to its interests if Iran succeeds in consolidating its new position as the leading power in the region.
