ABSTRACT
This paper uses methods and techniques of terroristic network analyses to investigate the Zerkani network responsible for the Paris attack of November 2015 and the Brussels attack of March 2016. As a first step, we construct two different appropriate cooperative games that take into account both the structure and strengths of the links of the Zerkani network and the individual and coalitional features of the members of this network. In the next step, the Shapley value is used to determine a ranking of the members of the Zerkani network. Since the number of members in the network is too large to determine the Shapley value exactly, we will use the structured random sampling method to approximate the Shapley value. The importance of a robust ranking is found in the decisions that intelligence services have to make in the allocation of their scarce resources. Hence, as a last step, we will evaluate the sensitivity of our ranking of the members in the Zerkani network by considering the difference in new rankings that are obtained by varying the individual information, the relational strength and in the incompleteness of the links in the network, respectively.
