ABSTRACT
WHAT is dealt with in this chapter is that aspect of Hegel's Absolute called its infinity. I have, therefore, left out the consideration of the ''mathematical infinite,"2 the "infinite of its kind,"3 etc. These infinites, on Hegel's own view, are not the true infinite, at least in so far as they are objects of thought. As an object of thought each of these infinites has thought set over against it, which is detrimental to its self-determination, that is, to its infinitude, and freedom which is characteristic of infinitude. Hegel asserts that every system is an infinite as a Being-for-Self. A true infinite, he says, "consists in being at home in itself with its other/'4
He gives as instances the "I , " the "Quantitative Ratio," etc. So the mathematical infinite also, when interpreted not as an endless something, but as a system, may be said to be covered by Hegel's definition. But Being-for-Self is not fully realized in these lower categories. "When we say ' 1 / we express the reference to self which is infinite, and at the same time negative. Man, it may be said, is distinguished from the animal world, and in that way from nature altogether by knowing himself as ' 1 / which amounts to saying that natural things never attain a free Being-for-Self, but as limited to Being-there-and-then, are always and only Being-for an other."5 Thus the mathematical infinite and the so-called infinites lower than the Absolute Idea are also Beings for an other, as they are always objects of thought and limited by it.
