ABSTRACT
IN Western philosophy the word tnãyã is used only in a despicable sense. If it is shown that a philosopher admitted mâyã somewhere into his system, it is regarded as tantamount to proving that his system is absurd. It has been more or less a term of abuse. But the previous discussion must have demonstrated by this time that any system which wants to avoid pluralism cannot but admit inexplicability at some place or other. Hegel has admitted Taushung; Spinoza clearly gives place to illusion; Bradley says that somehow, we do not know how, appearances issue forth from the Absolute and are merged in it; and Du BoisReymond cries 'ignoramibus' when asked to explain even life. It is doubtful whether even pluralism can satisfactorily explain each and every concept. Bradley's criticism of several categories in the first part of his Appearance and Reality shows that it cannot, and at every step it has to admit intellectual defeat.
