ABSTRACT

The charge of methodological solipsism is part of the anti-Husserlian folklore, despite arguments to the contrary. Once the sphere of immanence is identified as the realm of apodictic indubitability, it is on this foundation that all kinds of presumptive knowledge must be secured in a philosophically rigorous manner. The chapter discusses some of the specifics of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy of science. Intersubjectivity enters into scientific inquiry at the observational level, namely through the methodological demand for intersubjective reproducibility of experimental data and through the intersubjective nature of perceptual objectivation. In the usual course of events, perceiving a thing is to be intentionally directed toward a three-dimensional object in space. However, what is sensuously given at each moment in time is merely a two-dimensional appearance that presents one profile of the intended thing. It is no exaggeration to say that the notion of horizon is one of the most productive concepts in Husserl’s mature philosophy.