ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that hallucination is the least desired form of erroneous experience for a theory. As evident in the discussion so far, both externality and mind-independence are almost ubiquitous across all modes of perceptual experience. Only proprioperception, the haptic sense, or taste are exceptions, and even those of mind-independent things. The following approaches to hallucination may seem to explain, or even eliminate or reduce, hallucinations by appeal to something else. These are explanations of hallucinations in terms of imagination, internal objects, and memory experience. The chapter discusses illusions of imagining, experience that appear to the subject to imagining but are not. For many cases of hallucination, what is hallucinated appears to be real. The chapter suggests two alternatives to an imaginary or indirect memory re-description of hallucinatory experiences. The theories are comparable to those theories. The significant difference between this theory and the previous memory account is that this theory is commitment to memory experience being an unmediated experience.
