ABSTRACT
This conclusion presents some closing thoughts on the concepts covered in the preceding chapters of this book. The book argues on a case-by-case basis for this position. One might hold that, even if perceptual experience is erroneous by being illusory or hallucinatory, this should not be troubling. Some perceptual experiences are erroneous; others are not erroneous. The philosophy of time does not make a difference to the epistemological worry. We still have error—we just have a different kind of error. This commitment to other error is just as bad for the trustworthiness of perceptual experience in forming our beliefs about the actual world. A more specific objection to both the structure of perceptual experience and the philosophical position of time is this: causation cannot be a constitutive relation between elements of a perceptual experience. The book concerns a tenseless theory analysis of perceptual experience.
