ABSTRACT

This introduction presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book discusses the endless debate between “compatibilists” and “incompatibilists.” It describes the Harry Frankfurt’s famous argument that moral responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise both conflicts with and defeats the longstanding “ought-implies-can” maxim that blame for an action does require the ability to do otherwise. The book shows that, contrary to responsibility skeptics, genuine responsibility is at least metaphysically possible; that metaphysical libertarianism is at least metaphysically viable. It uses psychopaths, people who are incapable of compassion for others, to demonstrate that, contrary to the common wisdom, moral responsibility is not required for criminal responsibility and therefore for just criminal punishment. The book argues that adults who allow themselves to be indoctrinated by right-wing propaganda are willing addicts – enthusiastically addicted to the hate, outrage, and grievance that right-wing pundits and personalities consistently deliver to them.