ABSTRACT

Leaving the relations between the Mneme and Consciousness to philosophers undismayed by the contradictoriness of philosophical terms; and to physiologists who, like Dr. Head, are enlarging our positive knowledge by experiment even in their own corpore nobili, I find I cannot close this introduction without touching on two more points characteristic of this Mnemic Psychology. Of these one is Semon’s conception of the essential mnemic item, namely, the Image. The second point is the terminology 1 which Semon invented for his statements and problems. These two points are best treated together, inasmuch as they shed light upon each other. Since it is only by the substitution of such specialized terminology for everyday words, either distorted from their normal meaning or charged with irrelevant, misleading connotations, that we can accustom ourselves to think—well! of just the subject in hand. And nowhere more so than when that subject is Consciousness, our scanty notions of which have been almost hopelessly obscured by the metaphorical language of those who have tried like, for instance, Mr. Holt 2 to enlighten us about it.