ABSTRACT
After briefly reviewing the constitutional jurisprudence that defines the legal framework within which legislation is delegated in India, we go on to describe parliamentary procedure (in the form of parliamentary rules and parliamentary Committees on Subordinate Legislation) that demarcates parliamentary control of delegated legislation. Drawing on the analytical norms enshrined in the doctrine of separation of powers, we find that the substance of parliamentary control of delegated legislation to be very weak, reinforcing earlier findings of executive branch domination documented in studies looking at judicial control of delegated legislation. We go on to point to some implications of such weak control of delegated legislation and follow this up with ideas on both the nature as well as location of reforms. Given the difficulty of decreeing greater judicial control of delegated legislation, some procedural change of parliamentary rules pertaining to delegated legislation would probably be the most expeditious course of action. However, in light of our findings and analysis, we proceed a step further by suggesting that the legislature (as well as the judiciary) should take steps to follow certain principles such as the principle of least authority. Briefly speaking, the principle of least authority in relation to legislation lists the least amount of privileges to perform a function – insistence on such principles may allow the legislature to delegate more appropriately than has been the case.
