ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on a form of scepticism about sense, that developed by Kripke's Wittgenstein in Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. KW's sceptic now considers a suggestion which at first seems to issue in a plausible refutation of his sceptical argument. KW's sceptic, however, has two powerful objections to the dispositionalist account. Kripke distinguishes between two ways in which we might respond to KW's sceptic's argument. One way he describes as a 'straight solution'. Matters stand differently when Jones is considered, not as a solitary individual, but as a member of a linguistic community. Two sorts of general criticism can be levelled against KW's 'sceptical solution'. The chapter concentrates on an objection to the sceptical solution that has been raised by Crispin Wright, and suggests that it is at best inconclusive. In recent years, the standard interpretation has been challenged by a number of philosophers, including George Wilson, Alex Byrne, David Davies, Jussi Haukioja, and Martin Kusch.
