ABSTRACT
The mission in Dragonwar is focused on the war not the dragon, a doctrine for the military rather than a response to perceptions. Bureaucracy and doctrine, national inclination and military practice impose regularity that hampers a response to the unconventional. If Dragonwars are to be pursued effectively, the military, the orthodox and responsible, must neither deploy other dragons, nor craft without ideals, nor rely on additional power, on more when more may never be enough. Americans assume these Dragonwars need not necessarily be understood only won by deploying not only more but fieldcraft. Americans assumed ideas and convictions, the faith or the ideal, are subject to management and to coercive power. Americans, the people, the politicians, and the Pentagon are going to respond to perceived reality as always: ahistorical, optimistic, trusting in organization and enterprise, devoted to technology and management, and without empathy for others.
