ABSTRACT
The long and short of it is that there are two very different sorts of deliberations: cognitive deliberations regarding matters of information, and evaluative deliberations regarding matters of value. Whether certain means are appropriate to given ends is a question whose resolution must be addressed in the former, informational order of deliberation. An evaluative rationality that informs us that certain preferences are absurd—preferences that wantonly violate our nature, impair our being, or diminish our opportunities—fortunately lies within the human repertoire. The evaluative/normative aspect simply does not reduce without residue to the factual/descriptive. The crucial fact is that there is not only inferential reason but also evaluative reason. Evaluative rationality is an indispensable component of rationality overall. The sensible attunement of means to ends that is characteristic of rationality calls for an appropriate balancing of costs and benefits in our choice among alternative ways of resolving our cognitive, practical, and evaluative problems.
