ABSTRACT
This chapter suggests that the principles in our nature are not necessarily moral and highlights some problems with moral motivation. Psychological altruism is motivation with the ultimate goal of increasing another's welfare. Support for the empathy–altruism hypothesis raises the question of the evolutionary origin of empathy-induced altruism. The ultimate goal of empathy-induced altruism is to increase the welfare of the person(s) for whom empathy is felt. The studies provide considerable evidence that empathy-induced altruism and motivation to act morally are distinct motives that can conflict as well as cooperate. After his opening sentence on altruistic principles, Smith quickly moved to a particular form of imaginative perspective-taking to provide the basis for moral sentiments and moral judgment. Supporting Smith's opening assertion, recent research suggests that empathy-induced altruism exists and is surprisingly powerful. But empathy-induced altruism is not a moral motive; the ultimate goal is to increase the welfare of the person for whom empathic concern is felt.
