ABSTRACT
Perhaps the most common theme in the confirmation hearings held after 1969 is that a justice of the Supreme Court should make an effort to avoid overreaching. It is important, so say the nominees, for judges to be aware that their personal experiences and beliefs will influence their decisions and to guard against excessively personalized legal interpretations. The great difficulty with this subtle and powerful position is that prudent individuals would not want to exercise, indeed, would not be capable of exercising, the role that Bickel assigned to the Supreme Court. Prudence is not a bulwark against that kind of power; prudence is its repudiation. The promiscuousness of constitutional interpretation is a natural outgrowth of the moral idealism that underlies the modern Court's function. Because the Court's goals are thought to represent profound and timeless moral principles, the need for their realization is felt urgently and the opportunity for their realization is perceived everywhere.
