ABSTRACT
The emerging nexus between ethnocide and genocide is the salient feature of the Turko-Armenian conflict, affording a degree of continuity of destructive methods of conflict resolution. Indeed, the dynamics of victimization in intergroup conflicts are such as to produce a transition from limited to maximum victimization, should the conflict be sustained one way or another and at the same time should the absence of external deterrence persist, or be perceived by the perpetrator group to persist. This is the context in which Ittihad, otherwise called the Committee of Union and Progress Party, eventually charted its course against the Armenians and brought genocide to fruition during the ample opportunities provided by the Great War. The picture that emerges from these party congresses is the dual-track role performance of Ittihad. On the one hand there is the formulation of a platform outlining a party program that is intended strictly for public consumption.
