ABSTRACT
IV. 2. e. L E C T U R E O N E(2) Purely physical sciences: essentially non-mathe-matical, although they may involve mathematics, measurements, and statistics in some subordinate use.(a) They may be experimental or not. Thus, geology is not experimental; genetics is.(b) They may be statistical or not. Either the generalizations are primary inductions or they are only statistical generalizations. The statistical sciences are quasi-mathematical.(c) W ith respect to the way in which they describe the phenomena they study, they are:(1) Taxonomic (merely classificatory)(2) Physionomic (secular trends; life histories(3) Analytic (quasi-aetiological).Note: Mathematical physics is analytic, but not in the same way as the non-mathematical sciences. In either case, however, a practical knowledge of causes is involved [13].f. In the light of this summary it can be seen that there is a rivalry between two philosophical fields for the control of the particular natural sciences: mathematics (which does not consider causes), on the one hand, and general physics (which is primarily aetiological), on the other. In fact, the story of modern science can be told in terms of this rivalry. The particular natural sciences must get their principles somewhere, since they have a limited scope of investigation. They borrow their principles either from mathematics or from the philosophy of nature. There are, as a result, two sorts of sciences and accordingly two different philosophies of science, i.e., two different conceptions of the nature, aims and scope of science. I shall now attempt briefly to summarize this. V . T h e R e l a t i o n o f t h e S e v e r a l N a t u r a l S c i e n c e s Inter Se
1. The view one takes of the relation inter se of the particular natural sciences depends upon one’s metaphysics and philosophy of nature (general physics).a. Thus, in terms of an atomistic or Cartesian philosophy, all the physical sciences are reducible to a basic mathe-
V. I. a. L E C T U R E O N Ematical physics like mechanics, because the only properties of matter are quantitative and these are the properties to which mathematics is applicable. The mixed kind of physics (mathematical physics) looks forward to the day when all the other natural sciences will be reduced to it.b. In terms of an Aristotelian philosophy,—and this is the only other alternative,15-there is an acknowledged and irreducible heterogeneity of the physical sciences, and the non-mathematical sciences are not regarded as inferior. In fact, they are more purely physical than the mixed sciences of applied mathematics. The systems of phenomena which constitute the subject-matters of the several sciences are based on deeper distinctions in the nature of physical things. The particular natural sciences can, therefore, be arranged according to the kinds of bodies studied.(1) The primary distinction would be between the animate and the inanimate.(2) Subordinate distinctions would be made within these two realms: thus, within the inanimate, mechanical and chemical systems; within the animate, biological, psychological and social systems. This denies continuity and reducibility in nature in one sense and affirms it in another, in so far as the philosophy of nature and metaphysics provide principles which are common to all the particular sciences of nature.2. The view one takes of the relation between the sciences and philosophy depends, of course, upon one’s conception of philosophy.a. In terms of many contemporary conceptions of philosophy,—the positivist’s, the pragmatist’s, the sociologist’s,— philosophy is at best the handmaiden of the sciences.(1) It is not a body of knowledge having a content and validity independent of the results of scientific research.(2) It performs one or another literary or rhetorical function, which is ancillary to the acquisition of knowledge by the scientific method [14].(3) Like religion, it satisfies emotional needs, which a scientist is able to conquer or deprive. The pursuit 16 V d . Lecture II infra.
