ABSTRACT

III. 3. L E C T U R E T H R E Ed. Kant, influenced by Locke and Hume, on the one hand, and by W olff,21 on the other, presents a confused pic­ture. Kant is a faculty psychologist; his philosophy, in all three critiques, but especially in the Critique of Pure Reason,22 depends largely on his analysis of the soul, its powers and operations. Viewed positively, Kant is im­portant as an antidote to British associationism. Unfortu­nately there is the negative side: his erroneous analysis ofthe relations of sense, understanding and reason, his Rous-seauian addition of feeling as a separate faculty, his failure to see that man and not the transcendental ego is the sub­ject of the powers,—these are blemishes which give Kant, in psychology as in everything else, the pathetic status of being almost right [39a].e. Herbart23 took the position of Leibnitz, rejecting the faculties as mere fictions, and returning to a modified form of associationism,—a dynamic sort of “mental chemistry,” —in which W undt followed him,24 though not always consistently. f. Brentano 25 26is the only outstanding exception in modem times to the denial or misconception of faculty psychol­ogy. His “act-psychology” is clearly in the Aristotelian tradition. He is followed by Husserl and others24 who expanded his analysis in some respects but, because of characteristically modern deviations concerning meta­physics, muddled its clarity and simplicity.