ABSTRACT
III. 2 . C. L E C T U R E F O U R(1) This is neither a scientific nor a philosophical problem [53].(2) It is at this point that the metapsychology becomes speculative in the bad sense of unfounded “theory” about unobservable events.3. I shall survey the metapsychology, first by considering its topography and dynamics in the light of the traditional philosophical psychology [53a]; and then by showing why the genetics has no status either as scientific or philosophical knowledge.4. The Freudian topography is for the most part sound as philosophical psychology. It is, however, analytically inadequate. This can be shown by indicating briefly the translation of the Freudian and Aristotelian analyses.7a. The structures of the psyche = the parts or powers of the soul. (In neither case is the psyche or soul supposed to exist apart from the body. The Freudian correlates psychic structures with bodily parts; the Aristotelian correlates psychic powers with bodily organs, except in thecase of understanding. This difference is, of course, crucial and is the source of all the Freudian errors.711)b. The basic distinction of ego and id = the basic distinction between the rational and the non-rational parts of the soul.(1) Here the Aristotelian analysis is better because more complete. It distinguishes between the cognitive and the appetitive powers; in the case of the cognitive power, between sense and intellect; in the case of the appetitive power, between the natural or vegeta7 T h e translation which follows does not aim to be exhaustive but illustrative. Moreover, it will not be understood unless it is read as a statement of formal equivalence between the conceptual schema of tw o doctrines which, though the same, are expressed in different vocabularies. I have used the sign = to signify such formal equivalence. In making this translation between Freudian and Aris totelian doctrines, I have not distinguished between the contributions to the laitter which were made b y St. Thomas and b y Aristotle. 7a T h e problem in natural theology of the self-subsistence of the soul turns on the proposition that understanding is not the act of a bodily organ. V d . N ote 26 infra. There is no inconsistency between the fact that the soul is the substantial form of the composite and the fact that its one incorporeal power (intellect) is a mark of its capacity to subsist apart from the body upon the corruption of the com posite. From the point of view of psychology rather than natural theology, it is important to stress here that the soul is a formal principle, the proximate source of all the vital powers of which man is the subject, only one of which is a power of the soul per se.
