ABSTRACT
L E C T U R E F O U Rof development. This is the difference between an infant and a man.5. The Freudian dynamics is, to a lesser degree, sound philosophical psychology. Here the Freudian analysis makes one original contribution (the concept of repression), but in other respects, it is inadequate and even in error. As before, this can again be shown by a brief translation of the Freudian and Aristotelian analyses.a. The relation of ego and id. Freud recognizes, as Aristotle recognizes more fully, (1) the reciprocity of intellect and will, (2) the subordination of the will to both reason and the passions, and (3) the subordination of the sensitive appetite to both reason and vegetative needs.(1) According to Freud, the id is able to influence the ego, to determine its processes, and the ego is able to influence the id, in repression, censorship, etc. So in Aristotelian psychology, desire is the source of all activity, the acts of all the powers of the soul, on the one hand; and on the other hand, the acts of one of these powers, the cognitive power, determines desires. Not only does the intellect move the will and the will move the intellect, but the passions move the will and the will is able to control the passions. In short, there is a very complicated reciprocal interdependence of the rational and non-rational parts of the soul, as well as between the cognitive and the appetitive functions. This is because reason rules the non-rational part not as an absolute despot but only as a ruler suffered by free subjects, who can disobey and even usurp his power and subject him to their will [57].(2) Reason is able to operate independently of the passions, and the passions independently of reason. Freudian psychology must also recognize some independence of ego and id; that is, the ego can function to some extent apart from the id, and conversely. If this were not the case, their reciprocal subordination would be impossible [58].b. Types of dominance by the ego of the id (conflict and harmony, repression and discipline) = reason ruling the passions by counteracting their motions, or ruling them i n
III. 5. b. L E C T U R E F O U Rby moderating or perfecting them through prudence (the moral virtues) .8a(1) Here, although the two types of dominance are recognized by both Aristotle and Freud, the Aristotelian analysis is better because it more explicitlyrecognizes that the non-rational part of the soul is not anti-rational, but is rational to the extent that it is able to participate in reason, to be governed by reason.(2) The Aristotelian analysis of the way in which reason positively rules the passions (by prudence in the formation of the moral virtues) is much more adequate. But the Freudian account of the way in which reason negatively rules the passions,—the account of the conflict between ego and id, in terms of censorship and repression,—is a notable addition to the Aristotelian analysis at this point.9c. Types of dominance by the id of the ego (either determining its processes as in dreams, wishful thinking, etc. or in completely submerging it) = the influence which the passions exert upon reason and the complete obstruction of reason by temporary excesses of passion.911 TheFreudian analysis here is much more detailed, and adds positively and definitely to the Aristotelian account.d. The sources of conflict in the soul, i.e., causes of schizophrenia.10(1) The basic conflict is due to the fact that desire is subject to two determinations, by the pure id (or instincts) on the one hand, and by the ego, on the other. The ego conflicts with the instincts (or pure id) in the control or determination of desires. So the Aristotelian analysis speaks of the appetitive power as subject to determination by the vegetative power in so far as sensitive operations serve vegetative needs, and also as subject to determination by the cognitive power of reason.104 The source of the conflict is the same in both cases. V d . N o te 57 infra.
