ABSTRACT
I conclude this discussion b y stating one dilemma: either philosophy is not genuinely valid know ledge, w h ich rests d irectly on experience and is independent o f scientific research, or philosophy is know ledge w hich is superior, both speculatively and practically, to science. T h e m odern w orld, in its violent repugnance to the second horn o f this dilemma, has gradually torn itself free from w isdom b y em bracing the first. Cf. J. Maritain, Les Degres du Savoir, Paris, 1932: Ch. 2. 6a. In his introduction to this book D r. Alexander speaks o f m y con tem pt for “practical” accom plishm ents and m y failure to evaluate scientific concepts “according to the degree to w hich th ey increase our ability to control and influence natural phenom ena.” But, as w e have seen, there are tw o meanings o f u tility applicable to know ledge: (1 ) the use o f know ledge to control and influence natural phenomena, and in this sense science is m agnificently useful whereas philosophy is totally useless; (2 ) the use o f know ledge to determine the ultimate ends o f human conduct and the ordination thereto o f all proximate and rem ote means, and in this sense philosophy is practically indispensable whereas science can be disregarded. Scientific know ledge, at its best, provides us w ith a m astery over natural means or enables us to devise n ew means w here nature fails us. T h e simplest rule o f w isdom in the practical order o f human life requires us to choose means according to the ends th ey serve, and if these ends be n ot ultimate th ey must, in turn, be ordered to a final end. T h e practical utility o f science is, therefore, dependent upon a determination o f the order o f all human goods according as th ey are means and ends. It is clear that science itself does not make this determination; in fact, since such an ordering o f goods is normative and involves w hat is currently called “value judgm ents”, the scientist w ould be the first to admit, nay to insist, that the question o f the order o f goods is beyond him. If he dare to say that there is no objective order o f goods, no ultimate end, no right determination o f means,—as the psychoanalyst does in his claim that all moral standards are conventional or relative,—then he speaks as a philosopher and not as a scientist. A nd if he w ere right in his moral relativism, then h o w could he consistently defend his ow n dogm atic assertion o f the unquestionable value o f scientific know ledge because it enables us to control nature? Is such control good really or is it on ly a matter o f our w estern European opinion? A nd i f really, w hy?I do n ot deny the utility o f science, but I hold that the utility o f philosop hy is paramount. Ethics is architectonic in the practical order; all the applied sciences and the practical arts, all form s o f engineering and m edicine, are subordinate. A ll the scientific kn ow ledge w hich has been accum ulated since the Renaissance does n ot change, in one essential detail, the analysis o f man’s moral problem , the problem o f virtue
n o t e s ( f r o m p. 1 4 ) and happiness, as that is set forth in A ristotle’s E th ic s or the moral treatises o f the S u m m a T h e o lo g ic a . N o r w ill any further accretions o f scientific know ledge make any difference. If this can be called contem pt for the scientific achievem ent, then the opposite position is an idolatry o f science. Both contem pt and idolatry are avoided b y a just appraisal o f the goodness o f science in relation to the goodness o f w isdom. Science unquestionably increases human pow er to achieve the ends o f human lire. But the goodness o f this g ift o f pow er depends upon w hether or not it is properly used; and since the pow er is entirely a mastery o f means, that, in turn, depends upon w isdom about means and ends. Science w ithout w isdom is dangerously ambivalent; the greater the pow er, the m ore om inous is its improper use. T h e hazards o f human welfare in m odern times can be understood in the light o f the ever increasing disproportion betw een science and w isdom , betw een the operative pow er o f men in an age o f science and that clarity o f direction w hich guides m en only in so far as philosophy rules in the practical order. Even if philosophy w ere not attenuated in m odem times, its directive task w ould be made more difficult b y the augmented utilities w hich scientific advances confer.T his analysis o f the practical im portance o f philosophy and science applies to the relation o f ethics and psychotherapeutics. Psychoanalysis m ay be useful m edically w hen it is subordinated to sound morals; it is full o f danger to human w ell-being w hen it is substituted for m orality. V d . N o tes 61 and 62 in fra .
