ABSTRACT
W h en the distinctions are thus understood and ordered, the errors o f Kant becom e plain, and plainer still those w h o fo llow ed and misunderstood his errors. Kant not on ly made the positivistic error o f denying the possibility o f rational p sych o logy as a branch o f natural th eology , but he failed to see that the field o f empirical psych olo g y included problems capable o f clear philosophical solution and also
n o t e s ( f r o m p p . 8$, 8 j ) firoblems capable o f scientific determination b y m ethods w hich , in so ar as they are mathematical and experimental, do not differ from those em ployed b y physicists. O n ly to the extent that rational psych o logy includes questions concerning the m ode o f being o f the separated soul was Kant right in saying that rational psych o logy exceeded the bounds o f reason and belonged to the province o f faith (sacred th eo lo g y ). Such questions are not capable o f being solved w ith in the limits o f philosophy. A n y attem pt to do so must lead to paralogisms and dialectical frustrations. But the question, W heth er the soul has any self-subsistence, is as m uch a purely philosophical question (in natural th eo lo g y ), susceptible o f clear affirmative answer, as the question, W hether G od exists.
