ABSTRACT
E P I L O G U Eas Plato describes it in the Republic. This is the technique peculiar to philosophy, as investigation is to science. Unlike some modem Platonists who rely upon portions of the seventh epistle, I hold that this technique does not make philosophy merely dialectical, that Plato as well as Aristotle valued this technique as an instrument for getting valid knowledge and not merely as an instrument of controversy or the clarification of discourse. Plato used “dialectic” to name both the philosophical process and the product it achieves,— the wisdom that Aristotle called philosophia prima. If I stress dialectic as method, it is because it is necessary to make clear that the method of philosophy is not demonstrative in the sense in which modem mathematics is; it is not linear inference, deducing theorems from postulated premises. Finally, it should be added that the dialectical method of philosophy is a completely natural process of knowing; whereas the investigative method of science is technical, involving many auxiliary arts.Dialectic is the source both of advances in philosophical knowledge and of the multiple repetition of errors. It is a subtle technique, mastered only by a few. Although experimental ingenuity and inductive genius may be equally rare in science, division of labor in the scientific enterprise makes it possible for a multitude of drones to perform useful tasks which are within the competence of many. Science is always productively at work, even in the absence of great scientists. This is not true of philosophy. Here the many, lacking either great or distinctive dialectical skill, do little more than repeat old errors or old truths. And the errors are easier to repeat than the truths. Being the product of inferior dialectic, they are naturally more within the competence of the many. This partly explains why the errors of Platonism and materialism, originating in the ancient world, have been so often repeated in the mediaeval and the modem epochs; it also explains why the dialectic of St. Thomas improves upon, rather than merely repeats, Aristotelian principles and analysis. If Aristotle in his day was the master of those that know, St. Thomas, mastering Aristotle, was an even greater master in his day.Philosophical truth does not stand to philosophical error as white to black, if one considers a whole philosophy and not merely its constituent propositions. A true and a false philosophical proposition are related as contradictory, but a true philosophy must be compared with a false one in terms of dialectical criteria. The measures of truth in a whole philosophy are its intelligibility, its coherence and its adequacy, as well as the truth of its propositions. One philosophy is better than another as containing more truth
and more wisdom, better articulated. It is by such criteria that I have judged the superiority of Aristotle to Plato, and the superiority of St. Thomas to the neo-Platonic philosophies of the middle ages and modem times, not to mention materialism and the various confusions of doctrine which proliferate in all ages.The history of philosophy in modem times is complicated, first, by psychologism, and second, by the rise of positivism. W hen the question, H ow do we know? is made to precede all other philosophical analysis, metaphysics and the philosophy of nature suffer from the priority of psychology, and it in turn suffers from occupying the improper position of “first philosophy”; but worse than that, philosophers soon become occupied with questions about philosophical method as prior to all other philosophical questions. This ultimately leads to positivism and the denial that philosophy is knowledge of the real, independent of science. However sharp the contrast between the history of science in modem times and the history of philosophy in the ancient and mediaeval periods, it is even sharper if the comparison be made with the history of philosophy in the era of science. N ot only is there no progress in philosophy, but modem philosophers do not seem able to agree among themselves about their problems and methods. This is rarely the case among scientists; rarer, or even unthinkable, would be the case of a scientist who denied that science was knowledge, having separate problems and an independent method. Yet that is precisely the position of those paradoxical creatures, the philosophical positivists,—philosophers denying or, at least, abandoning philosophy. There is reason, therefore, for a philosopher to feel most embarrassed about the history of modem philosophy. He is confronted not only by the return to ancient and mediaeval errors, usually in a form that is less clear or significant, but also by the apparent loss of philosophy itself, or, at least, its degradation in the cultural nexus.This last point brings me to another aspect of the notes which calls for comment. At many points explicitly, and generally in tone, they seem to condemn the whole of modem times. I say “seem” because the condemnation is really restricted to what is condemnable: not the whole o f modem times, but the errors and misdirections which have unfortunately obscured and marred the genuine advances made in this period. As Maritain says, “to denounce a fundamental spiritual deviation in a period of culture is not to condemn that period. . . . An error in spiritual principle bears its inevitable fruit. W e must expose the principle and avow the loss. During the same period there is an evolution in human
affairs, an expansion of history; there are conjoined to certain evils, gains and achievements of mankind that have an almost sacred value” (Freedom in the Modem World, N ew York, 1936: pp. 84-85). The spiritual deviation of modern times is in philosophy and it is an evil that seems to have been necessarily conjoined with the gain and achievement which is science. W e have already seen that positivism made a philosophical advance in so far as, beginning with Hume and Kant, it formulated a clear conception of the nature of science. So far positivism must be praised. It is to be condemned only for its negations and exclusions which originate in the psychologism of modem philosophy. Similarly, science must be praised without stint for its magnificent contribution to human culture, even though the advent of science in the household of human knowledge almost dispossessed the older children, philosophy and theology. Again, as Maritain says, “if the loss or lowering of the metaphysical spirit is an incalculable damage for the general order of intelligence and human affairs, nevertheless, the predominance of the metaphysical spirit, when it is not accompanied by exceptionally vigorous critical rectifications, serves as an accidental hindrance to the particular interests of experimental research. And this accidental hindrance is a heavy cost, for experimental research, and the least advance in the least truth of fact, is also a thing of the spirit, and the spirit does not tolerate any hindrance” (Les Degres du Savoir, Paris, 1932: pp. 118-119).In other words, if we take a more comprehensive view of intellectual history, in which philosophy is only a part, we shall see modem times in a better light, and in the altered perspective the career of philosophy in the epoch of science may also be better understood. W e may even discern the promise of a new Aufklarung. To be brief, I shall report this more comprehensive view in a story. The characters are Plato (and his retainers), Aristotle (and his), Philosophy, Theology (and Religion), Science (and Technology). There are three episodes.(1) In the ancient world, Philosophy, Theology and Science were together as relatively undifferentiated parts of Human Knowledge. Yet their different personalities can be dimly seen if we note three moments in the development of Human Knowledge in the ancient world. It is as if Human Knowledge appeared upon the stage successively wearing three masks: the pre-Socratic mask is the face of Science turned towards the changing world; the Platonic mask turns the eyes of knowledge upward theologically; the Aristotelian mask bears the features of Philosophy not yet perfectly composed, because the line of its vision shifts now in the direction
of Science and now in the direction of Theology. It is in its Aristotelian personality that Human Knowledge was most mature in antiquity. Although real differentiation of characters has not yet occurred, the Aristotelian moment is the one in which the eyes of Philosophy have at least distinguished three directions in which Knowledge can turn. That is the Aristotelian achievement. In a sense, it is the birth of Philosophy.(2) In the mediaeval world,—a world made different by the Christian revelation,—Religion enters as a separate character. Human Knowledge is deeply moved by the part it must play, a role in which hospitality to this newcomer is mixed with strange fears. At first, and almost for a thousand years, Human Knowledge plays this part wearing the Platonic mask, but there are momentary, almost furtive, shifts of expression. Philosophy, having achieved some sense of its separate character in the ancient world, can no longer completely submerge itself in the personality of Theology. If it continues for many centuries to wear the Platonic mask, it is because that is most suited to expressions of hospitality toward Religion. The fears with which this geniality is mixed betray themselves in nominalistic caricatures of the face of Science, subde reversions to a pre-Socratic mood. It is not until Aristotle is remembered and resurrected that this conflict of emotions is resolved. The happy climax is reached in the 13th century when Aquinas effects the full separation of Philosophy from Theology. Human Knowledge is still ambiguously personified as Philosophy and Science, but it is in the now clear character of Philosophy that Human Knowledge is self-conscious of its distinction from another sort of knowledge which is the heart of Religion. Far from being tragic, this sharp differentiation enables Philosophy and Theology to understand each other as never before, and out of that understanding is bom their compatibility, their harmonious union. This is the Thomistic achievement. It is more than an echo of the Aristotelian moment of antiquity. It is a genuine advance toward the greater maturity of Human Knowledge, an advance in which Philosophy passes out of its infancy.(3) In the modem world, Technology is the innovator. Again Human Knowledge is profoundly stirred; this time by all the promises which Technology makes. The gifts with which Religion came are not forgotten entirely, but Technology offers a new world to conquer. The dowry it brings is an obvious one, as measurable and assessable as the things of this world. Human Knowledge is tom between what seems to be an assured happiness and the bright novelties which make Technology alluring. The strain
is too much. There is a gradual alienation of affection. At first Knowledge avoids a real breach by being deceptive. When it stays at home with Theology it is clearly philosophical in character, but when it goes out into the world with Technology it puts on the mask of Science. What is at first only a mask becomes through much worldliness a more and more distinct character. It is now Philosophy which is torn between Science and Theology. And extraordinary things being to happen. Philosophy finds it easier to get along with both Theology and Science by wearing the Platonic mask which twice before it had discarded. It tries to be all things at once. But the difficulties increase as Science and Theology move further apart. Human Knowledge in its Platonic personality aids in establishing the autonomy of Science, as in the early Christian period it made way for Theology. Under these circumstances, Philosophy finds it increasingly difficult to retain its own character. It tries so hard to understand Science that it almost ends in utter self-abnegation and in fitful forgetfulness of Theology. The Platonic mask, which in the ancient world reflected theological light, assumes the self-effacing features of positivism looking only at Science.The birth of Science is the achievement of the modern world. But unless one believes that Human Knowledge is Science and that Theology and Philosophy are immature expressions which it has outgrown, the historical drama is not yet concluded. The third act will not come to its happy ending until it reaches another Aristotelian moment in which Philosophy will attain full maturity, separate not only from Theology but from Science. Just as in the Thomistic synthesis, Philosophy and Theology became well-related through being well-separated, so in the synthesis yet to come Science and Theology will be united through being divided by Philosophy, itself in clear distinction from them both. If I am right in the prophecy of this next turn, the story is the tragi-comedy of human progress. There has been and will be a progressive differentiation of Human Knowledge. Theology, Philosophy and Science will be better related as three distinct characters than as three aspects of one. Religion and Technology will assume their proper places, together though differently encouraging this triumvirate of Knowledge. And Philosophy, which must play the central role because of its relations to Science and Theology, will have advanced to a better understanding of itself precisely because in our times it has almost lost itself in understanding Science, as once before it almost did in serving Theology.The intellectual history of western Europe thus told is not only
the story of a general cultural advance, but also the story of the progress of philosophy, in which Aristotle is the hero and Plato the somewhat benign villain. It was through correcting pre-Socratic and Platonic errors that Aristotle won the first fruits of purely philosophic wisdom. It was through correcting the many times multiplied neo-Platonic errors,—much more subtle than the original ones because colored by misunderstandings of Aristotle-that St. Thomas ripened these fruits. As heretics are the indispensable causes of a sounder orthodoxy in theology, so the increasing subtlety of philosophical error is necessary for the deepening of wisdom. St. Thomas was able to improve upon Aristotle, not only because he understood the master so well, but also because his understanding was magnified by the mastery of errors which were unknown to Aristotle. The neo-Platonists of the middle ages were more subtle adversaries for St. Thomas than Plato was for Aristotle. But St. Thomas did not finish the work of philosophy. Because of the rise of science in modern times, because of another tide of neo-Platonism,—this time complicated by a vigorous ret 1m to the materialism of the pre-Socratics and by the denials of positivism,—further philosophical tasks remain to be done. The fruits of wisdom can be brought to even fuller bloom in a third Auf-kldrung, provoked by the errors of modem times,—a consummation which may be achieved when men realize that Technology has failed to bring peace on earth. Their wisdom will turn upward again to the theological virtues instead of down to science and the industrial arts. These matters are too contemporary to permit an assured judgment, but I discern in Maritain’s Les Degres du Savoir the outlines, at least, of a synthesis of science, philosophy and theology which will do for us what St. Thomas did for philosophy and theology in the middle ages. In that synthesis, philosophical wisdom will be enriched. The understanding of science will make for an improved Thomism, as the understanding of theology enabled St. Thomas to improve upon Aristotle. Whether or not Maritain has accomplished this or merely forecasts it, he seems to me the only contemporary philosopher who has deeply sensed the movement of history and the point at which we stand. More than that, he has divined the principle of intellectual progress. It is a maxim which can be used as the title for the whole historical drama: distinguer pour tmir.If one turns from prophecy for the moment to survey the contemporary scene, one is forced to realize that the whole story is a tragi-comedy and that the tragic accent dominates the present. Positivism, which reached its high point in the 19th century, is still
ascendent in many quarters. Marxian materialism has not yet become truly dialectical materialism. W ith its affinities for mathematical physics and relational logic, on the one hand, and for Theology, on the other, neo-Platonism in many subtle varieties is still attempting to fuse science and religion. Formal materialism, though it is renewing its ancient and mediaeval vigor, has still many obstacles to overcome and victories to win if it is to produce a modem Aufklarung. It must assimilate Marxism, by showing itself to be the true dialectical materialism which Marx failed to derive from Hegel. It must do justice to the insight of positivism with respect to science, but avoid its blindness with respect to theology. This it can do by proper discrimination of the kinds of knowledge, converting Hume’s denials about philosophy into affirmations of the limits of science, and Kant’s antinomies and paralogisms into indications of the philosophical mysteries which mark the boundary between reason and faith. And, finally, formal materialism, today as ever, must strengthen itself against Platonic weaknesses,—particularly in regard to the relation of matter and form in the doctrines of substance and abstraction,—weaknesses which appear as soon as dialectical vigor is the least relaxed.In facing all of these tasks, in all that remains to be done, the position of psychology seems to me crucial because philosophy cannot be re-established in its separate autonomy until peculiarly modem epistemological errors are corrected. W e have seen how complicated is the network of reciprocal influences here,—how Platonism and psychologism have converged, how both have led to positivism, and how that in turn has prevented the science of psychology from reaching intellectual maturity. The cure of Platonism, the cure of positivism, both depend upon the rectification of psychology, as a science and in philosophy. But that also means that psychologists must be cured of Platonism and positivism. Psychology, therefore, seems to me that part of the field of science on which philosophy must win its decisive victory. Contemporary psychology,—particularly the doctrines which proclaim themselves as scientific,—is the source of much disorder in the practicalworld: in education, in morals, in religion, and even in economics and politics. That this is so follows necessarily from the relation of psychology to all practical problems; it is the theoretic root of the moral disciplines. The view which one takes of human nature determines how one lives as a man, alone and with others. The modern view of man, produced by the divorce of psychology from philosophy and its wedding to science, brings man to a lower state than he fell to from grace. The nobility with which man walked as a
rational animal in Greece, the spirituality of man as a person in the middle ages,—these have been lost or obscured. And in their place is the bare objectivity of the man whose nature has been equated to the limited devices of the laboratory and the clinic. The position of psychology in modem culture is crucial both in the practical and the speculative dimension. I have no doubt that it will be rectified and that man will again rise to proper self-esteem, because I have no doubt that philosophy will reach a new fruition, healing thereby the disharmonies and blemishes of modern times. But this is prophecy, and if the prophet turn his eyes from the future to the present, the note of hope in his voice must give way to the tone of a Jeremiad.
