ABSTRACT
III. 3. e. L E C T U R E O N Eobject. The two kinds of knowledge can, however, be distinguished by reference to what is known of this common object:(1) The formal object of historical knowledge is the thing in its particularity.(2) The formal object of scientific knowledge is the thing in its universality.There is a further distinction between history and science. The historian is primarily concerned with questions of existence,—whether or not his material object, a certain particular, exists, or existed. But the scientist is never concerned with the existence of his material object, physical things in general. He does not question the existence of the phenomenal order. (A full understanding of these distinctions depends not only upon a grasp of the distinction between sense and intellect, but also upon the comprehension of basic metaphysical distinctions between the form and matter, the essence and accidents, of entia naturae, as existing and as objects of knowledge.)4. The distinction between science and philosophy.a. They are alike in one essential respect as knowledge; and this differentiates them both from history. They are both knowledge of things in their universality.(1) Their propositions, their conclusions, are general propositions.(2) In both, the primary inductions,—on which everything else rests,—are inductions from sense-experience.b. To the extent that they have the same material object, —the things of the physical world,—which is the proper or cognate object of all human knowledge, they cannot be distinguished in subject-matter. (Nor can we, at this point, completely distinguish them in terms of their formal objects. W e shall return to this principle of distinction later, at 5. infra.)c. They must be differentiated, then, by method. This differentiation can be made only with respect to the activity of the senses and not with respect to the activity of the intellect. In other words, philosophy and science do not differ methodologically in their reflective dimensions. In both induction is the same, judgI I
III. 4. C. L E C T U R E O N Ement is the same, analysis is the same, proof is the same, etc. Hence, their difference in method must be in the observational dimension. This difference can be stated in terms of the difference between common and special experience [5].( 1 ) Com m on experience: perceptions not produced by, or in any way resulting from, processes of research or investigation, but rather arising from the normal operation of the sense-organs in the ordinary life of the animal. Common experience is the sense-experience of the ordinary man. It is constituted by undirected, unmethodic observations.(2) Special experience: sense-data resulting from the special operations which we shall call “investigation,” i.e., all the motions and manipulations, with or without apparatus and instruments, of men seeking and doing something for the sake of observing. The experience is special in the sense that the scientist differs from other men in what he does in order to observe, and therefore what he observes is different. Thus, we have the experience of the laboratory (usually with apparatus), of field research, of the clinic, etc.(3) It is because investigation is a special kind of doing, a kind of physical activity or operation, that we speak of the data of science, the special observations resulting from such doing. W e do not speak of the data of philosophy since the experience that philosophy reflects about is the common experience of all men. But the scientist reflects about his special data. This must not be interpreted to mean that he can ignore the common experience of all men; it means only that that is insufficient for him; and, therefore, he investigates.(4) Digression: This difference is made clear by the analogous difference between investigative and non-investigative history. The knowledge which one has of one’s own life as a matter of personal memory is non-investigative history; almost all other history is investigative.(5) Term inology: W e shall use the words “science” and “philosophy,” without qualification, to name investigative and non-investigative knowledge, which
III. 4. c. L E C T U R E O N Ehas generality. W e can also speak of the investigative and the philosophical sciences.5d. This distinction between philosophy and science explains a number of things that are generally recognized about their difference [6]:(1) Their different relations to common sense.(2) Their different degrees of change and progress, and the conditions of progress in the two fields.(3) The difference between the locus of contingency and the possibility of error in the two fields.(4) The utility of science and the inutility of philosophy, in one meaning of utility, namely, the use of knowledge to direct operations for the alteration or change of things, which is commonly called prediction and control. There is another meaning of utility: i.e., the use of knowledge to determine means and ends in human conduct, in which sense philosophy is practical, as in ethics and politics. But in the first sense philosophy is not useful. Metaphysics and mathematics, both of which are philosophical knowledge, illustrate this negative point. There is no metaphysical or mathematical engineering. Science, on the other hand, can become practical or applied in the technological sense because the knowledge it has achieved results from doing with respect to things and hence can again lead to doing with respect to things [6a].e. Finally, we can understand why there should be no conflict between philosophy and science, no rivalry, but rather good order and cooperation.(1) The reason is that special experience does not alter common experience; it merely supplements common experience with respect to details. But philosophical truths are the highest generalities of common experience. In respect to the sort of data phi5 In the 17th century, the w ord “philosophy” was the commonly accepted name for knowledge which had generality, in contradistinction to history. N ew ton distinguished himself b y taking the name of “experimental philosopher.” T h e word “science” today, as it is com m only used, thus denotes what the phrase “experimental philosophy did in the 17th century. T h e basic distinction between philosophy and science remains the same whether w e name the kinds of knowl edge distinguished as “abstract philosophy” and “experimental philosophy,” or as “philosophical science” and “investigative science.” T h e criterion of the dis tinction is method: the employment of investigative procedures.
