ABSTRACT
A 'systematic theory' or a 'systematic moral conception' cannot at one and the same time also constitute an account, whether systematic or otherwise, of only one particular virtue, however important and perhaps transcendent. Being first virtues of human activities, truth and justice are uncompromising. What Nisbet percipiently if unenthusiastically hailed as 'the long-awaited successor to Rousseau's Social Contract' opens with a manifesto declaring the indefeasibility of the claims of justice. It is a pity that Rawls was not more willing to learn from his Classical predecessors, and especially from The Republic. There are only two footnote mentions: one a repudiation of anything like the Noble Lie; and the other a reference to Plato's employment of a notion of a social contract. The reckless ruling should today appear so obvious not only to Rawls but also to many others constitutes a remarkable index both of oversophistication and of parochialism.
