ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on whether Aristotle has a concept of will at all and how he handles the roles for which that concept has been traditionally cast. It deals with the initiation of movement and the emotions, in order to show how Aristotle's psychology handled them before they were turned into separate faculties of willing and feeling. Aristotle's first assumption is that all movement in humans and animals is purposive, that is, for the sake of something. The instrument by which appetite effects movement is discussed in detail in On the Movement of Animals. A most interesting point in the discussion is his attempt to set up a relation between affirming or denying in intellectual matters and pursuit or avoidance in practical matters. Aristotle's treatment of the emotions is thus markedly comprehensive, making room for the physiological, the behavioral, the introspective, the phenomenological, and the dynamic or functional. Aristotle wants to deal with all of these in their interrelations.
