ABSTRACT
First, this notion has three peculiar implications: (1) Benefit sharing as opposed to its hoarding (li, ^IJ). This is Mencius’ distinct contribution (ethical uprightness as inclusive of benefit), following Confucius. (2) Situational appropriateness (or relevance) as opposed to its hegemonic disregard. Mencius’ yi has this connotation, which Hsiin Tzu specifically emphasized. (3) Personal virtue-cultivation to cosmically pervade in C h’i or Tao. This meaning is opposed to dissipation of the self in tyrannical selfishness or assiduous studies. Mencius’ yi carries this connotation, which Wang Yang-ming (3E.SI
1472-1529) made his central doctrine. Secondly, despite a recent resurgence of Aristotelian
virtue-ethics in the West, “righteousness” in the West has been racked by fierce debates over the utilitarian spread of pleasure as happiness to the most people, as against pure formal rigorism of deontologism, irrelevant to happiness. Mencius’ yi, as described above, has little to do with Kant’s “duty for duty’s sake,” or M ill’s “most happiness for the most people,” or even Aristotle’s “harmonious development of personal virtues.”
