ABSTRACT

This chapter examines whether the idea of neutrality—broadly interpreted as restricting the state in relation to all conceptions of the good—can indeed be given an adequate justification. It examines the arguments in favor of the idea that the state ought to be neutral in aims. The foremost defender of the idea in the contemporary debate is Ronald Dworkin. By contrast, Dworkin seems to provide a more elaborate account of how legal doctrines may provide a basis for political neutrality. According to Dworkin, the idea of equality before the law restricts legislators in the pursuit of moral and political aims. Dworkin’s theory of integrity in law echoes ideas that have important precedents. Any government must, Dworkin argues, treat all citizens “as equals” or “as entitled to equal concern and respect". According to Stephen Holmes the idea of liberal neutrality is implicit in common ideas such as “law equally applied to all” or “judicial neutrality".