ABSTRACT
This article proposes a new understanding of the concept of na tional security after the end of the Cold War. The new concept con sists of four ideal elements. The first is the political-military posi tion of any country vis-a-vis other nations as either allies or enemies. In the latter case, the second element is the perception o f threat of a country with enemies. The third element is the purpose of a country for its military involvement abroad, and the fourth element is the point o f time for this action. In short, national security is defined by four Ps ¡Position, Perception of threat, Purpose, and Point of time for military intervention. This concept is then applied on the na tional security situation of Israel revealing the inconsistency between its incorrect and its proper (ought-to-be) foreign policy. Israel is today threatened by no nation from the outside and therefore Israel has more room for maneuvering in foreign policy than ever and than normally believed. But Israel acts as if it was not the case because Israel wrongly interprets the terror attacks of Hamas and Hizbollah as if they were actions of a hostile nation. It seems as if the present political leadership (December 1997) keeps Israel and the Israelis in a war-like situation instead of demonstrating political courage by redefining its security situation in a proper way: even though peace
is neither close nor independent of terror-actions, peace in this re gion is today determined within Israel and by the Israelis, while twenty years ago it was decided by the Arabs outside Israel.
