ABSTRACT
The work of Alfred Schutz, who had been described as "the principal pioneer and architect of phenomenological sociology", is the ideal place to examine Verstehen in the context of phenomenology. According to Schutz, the confusion plaguing discussions of Verstehen is partially the result of a failure to distinguish between Verstehen "as the experiential form of commonsense knowledge of human affairs, as an epistemological problem, and as a method peculiar to the social sciences". Schutz interpreted Max Weber as advocating that human action be understood according to the postulate of subjective meaning and, since he said that he held the same postulate, he argued that his theory was in accord with Weber. The problems of Schutz's position indicate that he not only has misunderstood Ernest Nagel and the empiricist tradition represented by him but that his own account of Verstehen introduced a priori unjustified restrictions on social scientific inquiry.
