ABSTRACT
David Lewis has developed a more sophisticated version of the contrary-to-fact conditional interpretation of causal relation. Although the "causal influence" theory supposedly subsumes and expands upon the original "counterfactual dependence" theory, the two theories provide different answers to overdetermination cases. Absences may enter causal relations as causes or effects. In "causation-by-omission," absences are causes. There are problems with the above position on causation. Causation-by-omission is a difficult problem for counterfactual analysis. The contrary-to-fact-conditional view of cause is subject to the same difficulties about cases of overdetermination that beset the "cause-as-necessary-condition" view. Cases of simultaneous preemption, or "trumping," highlight the inadequacy of the chain of counterfactual dependencies defense. Necessarily, the assessment of counterfactual claims will be indirect. In "Causation as Influence" Lewis broadened his analysis by subsuming the original concept of "causal relation as the ancestral of counterfactual dependence" under a concept of "causal influence."
