ABSTRACT
The inability of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to maintain the truce, a matter of luck, bad communications, differing priorities, and Whitelaw's failure to intervene, reduced the Provos' options. The British were apparently securely wedded to the plebiscite concept–no secession without majority consent–and confident that the Army was getting on top of the IRA. The advent of the Labour government brought no lessening of Provo pressure and, if anything, engendered a greater determination on the part of the militant Loyalists to bring down the Executive, if the members voted to accept the Sunningdale Agreements. President MacGiolIa blamed the Provos and Loyalists like Craig for increasing the strength of Fascism in Northern Ireland. In a sense, from the Provo's brief unilateral truce in March 1972, proving their control over the Northern units there had been a long bloody watershed, every initiative that ignored the Provos collapsed–as did every formula that denied the militant aspirations of the Loyalists.
