ABSTRACT
One of the gravest errors of the entire school of British moralists lies in their departure from Greek and Christian ethics in seeking to derive the facts of love and hate from fellow-feeling. This has usually come about through putting sympathy into the foreground, and substituting benevolence in place of love. 'Benevolence' includes an element of remoteness and superiority on the part of the well-wisher, a certain 'condescension' which may easily rule out the possibility of love. Moreover the feeling of 'benevolence' also involves the making of an effort towards the well-being of the other; it is not properly a volition, but an impulsive tendency to self-exertion. First of all, love has an intrinsic reference to value, and for that reason alone it cannot be a fellow-feeling. Even 'self-love', as distinct from mere egoism, has reference to value, and cannot, by its very nature, be 'sympathy for oneself'. Secondly, love is not a 'feeling', but an act and a movement.
