ABSTRACT
Asecondgeneralconceptthatderivesfromthemodelistheactor's realizationofinterests.Itispossibletocalculatejusthowfullythis systemsatisfieseachactor'sinterests,sinceweknowthefinalcontrol andtheoutcome.However,twoquitedifferentthingscanbemeantby hissatisfactionofinterests.First,thedegreetowhichhe,throughhis ownpower,isabletorealizehisinterests;andsecond,thedegreeto whichhisinterestsarerealizedbytheactualoutcomeoftheevents. Thefirstofthesepaysnoattentiontotheoutcome,andshowsonly theexpectedrealizationofintereststhroughhisownpower.This realizationofintereststhroughhisownpowerisdefinedastheincrementinprobabilityofdesiredoutcomethroughhisvote,multiplied byhisinterestinthatevent,overallevents.Ifci1isthefinalcontrol thathepossessesovereventi,andweassumethatwithprobability 0.5thiscontrolwouldbecastinthedesireddirectionifhedidnot holdit,thenhisexpectedinterestintheabsenceofanyactionby himselfis0.5,andtheincrementinexpectedinterestduetohis actionsis0.52:1x11 c";1•Thismeansthathistotalexpectedrealization ofinterests,consideringonlyhisownactions,is0.5+0.52:1x11ci1,and theincrementduetohisownactionsis
aiJ=0.52:x 11.ciit...(4.3) wherea11istheincrementinexpectedrealizationofinterestsbyactorj, consideringonlyhisownactions.Inthebasictheory,ci1istheratioof hisinterestinitothevalueorpriceofi,timeshispower,c;'1=(x1dv1)r1• Itatfirstappearsthatci1canbegreaterthan1.0bythisdefinition,for ifhehasallhisinterestineventi,andthepriceofiislowrelativeto hispower,thenci1wouldbegreaterthan1.However,thefallacyinthis argumentliesinthefactthatv1isinpartdeterminedbyhispower,r1 ; ifallhisinterestliesineventi,thenv1willbeequaltor1evenifnoother actorhasaninterestini,andgreaterthanr1ifanotheractordoeshave interestini.Moregenerally,theminimumvalueoftheeventi,when nootheractorhasaninterestini,isr1x1;,asshownbyeqns.3.6and 3.3.Thisensuresthattheupperlimitofci1is1.0.