ABSTRACT
Chapter 3 examines the various foreign policy options available to China to pursue a resolution to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. These options can be divided into two main categories: (a) peaceful or diplomatic resolution options and (b) military resolutions options. The former covers both non-binding (bilateral negotiations, mediation, conciliation, good office, etc.) and binding (arbitration and adjudication) options, while the latter focuses on direct use of force (invasion) and coercion. This chapter provides a detailed overview of these options, including past utilization of such avenues and their compatibility with Chinese strategic thinking, and their potential execution in the context of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. From a rational choice perspective, the chapter focuses primarily on the feasibility of these options along key metrics (such as balance of power between China and Japan), while the cost-benefit analysis is undertaken in a successive chapter. The chapter highlights that various non-military resolution options suffer from critical weaknesses (such as Japan’s policy of not recognizing the dispute and the relatively weak legal case for Chinese sovereignty). In contrast, China enjoys a relatively equal balance of power with Japan, although potential U.S. intervention alters this significantly.
