ABSTRACT
This chapter distinguishes between pure deliberation, the three forms of deliberative negotiation, and pure bargaining. In the integrative moments in negotiation, participants discover or create joint gains beyond those demarcated by the original zone of possible agreement. In the contrasting distributive moments, all joint gains have been captured and only zero-sum distributions remain. Like the partially integrative solutions, a fully integrative solution is possible only when the parties have differing valuations of the different aspects of the good or goods about which they are negotiating. In the case of pure bargaining, the negotiation lacks deliberative elements. Instead of disclosing information to discover joint gains, the parties will take full advantage of information asymmetries to reveal only what is strategically useful. They will make fair offers only when their opponent will reject anything else. In this mode, the parties seek only to exercise power, exploit institutional advantages, and gain as much as possible at the expense of the other.
