ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that the appropriate normative criteria for judging the more identified forms of representation are systemic, in contrast to the dyadic criteria appropriate for promissory representation. The criteria are almost all deliberative rather than aggregative. Addressing the norms appropriate to a system of representation assumes that representation is, and is normatively intended to be, something more than a defective substitute for direct democracy. The model of anticipatory representation requires a concept of power different from traditional, forward-looking, intention-based concepts such as Robert Dahl's or Max Weber's. The chapter focuses on the model of gyroscopic representation that prevails in the United States. In the United States, gyroscopic representation forms a relatively large part of the representative process. In surrogate representation, norms of congruence, when applicable, apply to the polity as a whole. Deliberative goals may justify some of the inequality currently characteristic of surrogate and other forms of representation.
