ABSTRACT
The author argues that to begin to understand phenomenological philosophies and their implications for phenomenological methodologies it is important to dig into "of," "in," and "through." Over the years, phenomenological researchers have disagreed- sometimes sharply- as to whether one is or should be seeking to describe or interpret phenomena through the phenomenological research act. The most important word in Husserl's proclamation that consciousness is always "of" something is, in fact, the word "of," as "of" then becomes the transitory word that connects the subject with objects. The word "of" also signifies to Husserlian-oriented phenomenologists that meaning belongs to the intentional relation between subject and object. In Heideggerian-oriented phenomenological research, intended meanings are conceived in being and language, which are always, found "in" intersubjective, contextual relations. Philosophically speaking, Continuing to use the term "consciousness" in a "through-ness" conception would thrust one back into the ego.
