ABSTRACT
This chapter explains the conclusion of Chapter 5. It argues that there is little or no benefit to parties from making more inclusive electoral appeals, as most voters are drawn to those which they consider to most effectively represent the interests of their own bloc and do not, on the whole, base their vote on socio-economic issues. This is ultimately the result of Northern Ireland remaining deeply divided into the post-Good Friday Agreement era due to the continued salience of the ethno-symbolic principles of unionism and nationalism. Despite the effectiveness of consociational power sharing as a means of managing violent conflict, it has been less successful in facilitating conflict transformation away from the significance of the two distinct ethno-national communities, although proponents of the theory make no guarantee that any mitigation towards a shared identity can be achieved. The chapter concludes with a comparative analysis of two other cases where consociationalism has been employed in a divided society – Brussels and Malaysia. These have been chosen due to their differences from Northern Ireland. Both have a longer history of consociational power sharing, whilst in Brussels arrangements are corporate, which differs from the liberal character of Northern Ireland’s institutions. Evidence from these corroborates conclusions from Northern Ireland and allows their cautious application to divided societies in general.
