ABSTRACT
This chapter overviews the environmental ethics literature related to biodiversity and its value, and focuses on the question of whether biodiversity can have 'value on its own'. One of the basic analytical concepts of environmental ethics is the classification of axiological arguments according to how they respond to the so-called demarcation problem, i.e. the identification of the moral community, the group of entities towards which people have moral duties or, in the language of value theories, members of which have intrinsic or inherent values. Eser et al. distinguish three types of arguments used in environmental debates, which can be loosely connected to three major strands in ethical theory: prudential arguments, justice arguments and good life arguments. A recent review of different interpretations of the concept of intrinsic value and their applicability to biodiversity can be found in McShane. She distinguishes the following interpretations: moral standing, objective value, non-instrumental value, non-extrinsic value, final value, unconditional value, overriding value, and non-anthropocentric value.
