ABSTRACT
This chapter shows that even if people cannot identify 'intention' as an explicit theme in the latter texts one can, nevertheless, still find it to be a genuine ingredient 'surfacing' now and then. Two central features of Wittgenstein's view are, on the one hand, the emphasis of the 'diffuse' existence of the mental processes in time, and, on the other hand, the argument against their privacy. The Wittgenstein emphasized that there is no necessary connection between a thought-process and a brain-process. People shall now attempt to historically trace the most important literary sources from which Wittgenstein may have received his views concerning the theme of 'intention'. It is therefore at least plausible that some of Wittgenstein's thoughts on intention, in addition to Frege and Schlick, have some of their intellectual roots in Franz Brentano's writings as mediated by Husserl's texts. The owner of a 'private language' cannot find support for his memory from any 'official' instance, say, an encyclopaedia.
