ABSTRACT
This chapter offers a rough sketch of a new semantic theory, to be called 'constructivism', and discusses that Ludwig Wittgenstein adhered to the theory, at least in respect of its fundamental contentions'. According to the terminology formulated by Michael Dummett these are the Realist and the Anti-Realist conceptions of language and mathematics. A number of philosophers have acknowledged the importance of Anti-Realist interpretations of Wittgenstein's texts. Thus one can mention not only the 'earlier' Baker and Hacker as well as Wright, but also, for example, such writers as Rundle, Pollock, Richardson and Vision. To even ask a question exhibits a grammatical confusion and any counterexample produced to an instance of an internal rule in fact amounts to a novel rule. The point is that, according to Wittgenstein, one cannot have any 'theoretical' opinion of whether an internal 'rule' is correctly applied or not. No 'philosophical debate' is possible.
