ABSTRACT
In the decade following the conclusion of the first wave of Association agreements, an extensive literature has been published on the subject. Despite the large number of studies available however, our knowledge in this field remains somewhat fragmented. Employing some degree of simplification, the existing literature on the Association agreements can be divided into four broad categories:
Studies that challenge the economic and political rationale of the EC's Association strategy
As far as economics is concerned, the EC's strategy during the Association negotiations is no stranger to criticism (see, for example, Winters, 1992; Messerlin, 1993). Perhaps the most authoritative study in this field has been conducted by Rollo and Smith (1993). Modelling the effects of complete trade liberalisation between the EC and Eastern Europe in the so-called sensitive sectors, the two authors concluded that the gains of the EC's taxpayers and consumers (as a result of increased competition, lower prices and subsidies) far outweighed the losses of the EC's producers. Consequently, in addition to the gains it would have brought to Central and East European producers, such a trade liberalisation would also have been beneficial for the EC economy, even in the event that the EC had to fully compensate its producers for their losses (Rollo and Smith, 1993:155). A year before, Baldwin et al. (1992) reached a similar conclusion and argued for the reciprocal benefits of the CEECs being included in a European Economic Space which would involve free trade, but not labour mobility (1992: 91). Nevertheless, while making a convincing case as to why the EC's trade protectionism in the
Association negotiations was unnecessary (since such a practice was damaging for both the EC and the CEEC economies), most of these studies shed little light on the fundamental question of how and why such a policy came about.
