ABSTRACT
The Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement (MRTJ) denies propositional realism. The fundamental motivation for direct realism is the desire to put our minds in contact with the world without any intermediary veils. Bertrand Russell had tried to live up to this desire by conceiving of judgement as a binary relation between the mind and a proposition - a proposition comprised by the very things that the judgement is about or invokes. The combination of propositional realism and direct realism, given Russell's account of propositional unity, does seem to give rise to the picture that Ruth Barcan Marcus sketches. Russell and Moore had good reason for thinking that truth was a philosophical primitive. Russell's philosophy, in its effort to rid itself of psychologism, had actually neglected to take account of important psychological data. Russell's theory of types doesn't stratify universals, or properties, or entities: it stratifies propositional functions into a hierarchy of types.
