ABSTRACT
Introduction This chapter prepares the ground for the empirical investigation of the main questions raised in this study. First, a general discussion of the comparability of the EU and CLRTAP contexts is made. Is this a case of incomparable ‘apples and oranges’?. This is followed by an analysis of the operationalisation and measuring of the main dependent variable in the study, namely ‘policy strength’. The important issue of explaining policy strength is then taken up. After introducing ‘institutionally flavoured inter-govemmentalism’ as the theoretical cornerstone of the study, the institutional issues covering changes in membership and decision-making procedures will be discussed, and some selected EU, CLRTAP and comparative propositions will be formulated. Thereafter, the important issue of rival explanations is taken up and some key rival propositions are introduced, along with a further clarification of the issue of case selection. The chapter concludes with a summary of the main perspectives of the study in the form of two simple models; one pertaining to the development of policy strength within the two contexts over time, and one to the ‘synchronic’ comparison of the two contexts. ‘Apples and Oranges’? Comparisons within and between the EU and CLRTAP A central methodological tool utilised in this study is diachronic and synchronic comparison. Although comparing air pollution policy-making within the EU and CLRTAP over time is in no way unproblematic, it has the distinct advantage of at least comparing different versions of the same ‘creature’, operating within roughly the same context. It can be assumed that many factors change only slightly over time, and in order to study the
specific impact of institutional changes, this facilitates the general challenge of holding control variables constant. However, as pointed out in Chapter One, it is also interesting to compare EU and CLRTAP air pollution policy-making more directly and synchronically. First, EU’s NEC Directive and CLRTAP’s Gothenburg Protocol develop country-specific emission ceilings linked to the same four pollutants. Moreover, as the problems addressed by both institutions are quite similar and overlapping, this provides a good opportunity to scrutinise the impact of several, at least formal, institutional differences between the EU and international environmental regimes such as CLRTAP. Back in 1983, Wetstone and Rosencrantz predicted that the EU was the organisation most likely to succeed in dealing with Europe’s transboundary air pollution problems.4 This claim is echoed much more recently by McCormick (1997) where he states that ‘[the EU] has legislative tools and powers of persuasion that allow it to compel its members to reach agreement in a manner that is far beyond the scope and powers of a purely international organization such as the ECE’ (McCormick 1997:96). How do such general claims stand up in more elaborated and specific comparisons?However, some would undoubtedly ask whether it is really meaningful to compare EU air pollution policy-making and policies with that of within CLRTAP. Is this not a case of comparing apples with oranges? In one sense these institutions are, of course, quite different in nature. CLRTAP was established and has functioned as a ‘classic’ international environmental regime, focusing on one specific and transboundary environmental problem (air pollution), within a traditional inter-state cooperative context.5 As in most international environmental cooperation, the main regulatory instrument has been the adoption of protocols, subject to national ratification processes and subsequent (and often several years later) entry into force.6By contrast, the EU started as an European Economic Community back in 1957, and the environment was not added to the agenda before the 1970s.7 Hence, environmental policy-making in the EU, including air pollution, was initially based upon and still is significantly influenced by trade harmonisation and internal market concerns. For instance, Duncan Liefferink (1996:189) has put forward the proposition that ‘EC environmental policy making is essentially about economics’.8 Moreover, air pollution is only one of a number of environmental problems addressed by the EU. Further, as described in more detail below, EU institutions and decision-making procedures have developed into a complex institutional machinery, acquiring supra-national traits along the way. Finally, EU ‘environmental’ regulations take many forms, with directives as the main
instrument preferred so far. Directives are binding as to the results to be achieved, but leave to the Member States the choice of form and methods.9 They are not subject to ensuing national ratification processes, but require a process of transposition into national law and policy before practical implementation can commence.However, it can still be argued that there is a fundamental commonality which warrants comparative efforts. Seen from the perspective of any EU member state, EU environmental directives and CLRTAP are both international commitments requiring domestic attention and follow-up. Moreover, in this specific case the commonality is particularly striking, as the policies developed within both contexts are structured around emission ceilings targeting the same four substances. Hence, at the level of policies, it makes sense to talk about both EU directives and CLRTAP protocols as ‘different sorts of apples’. Then there are clearly fundamental differences between the institutions EU and CLRTAP as such; the practical results of such differences being very interesting to scrutinise further. As pinpointed by Wallace and Wallace (2000:40): ‘In most areas there is competition between the EU and other possible arenas’. The Issue of Policy Strength: Political ‘Bite’ and Implications for the Environment We can now turn the focus of our attention to the main dependent variable in this study, namely the concept of policy strength. There are several reasons why this concept is the predominant object in the study. First, at the time of writing the main processes under scrutiny have only recently been concluded, and little or no implementation has so far taken place. Second, and no less important, the strength of policies has important environmental problem-solving implications. Agreeing on policies which are in accordance with critical limits in the environment comes close to being a necessary condition for successful problem solving. However, achieving such strength cannot be seen as a sufficient condition for problem solving, as the crucially important and difficult phase of implementation can ‘dash the high hopes in Brussels and Geneva’ - to borrow a famous paraphrase.10 Moreover, as we will return to, achieving strong policies by, for instance, voting down laggards may mean trouble in the implementation phase. Hence, important implementation perspectives need to be kept in mind also in a study of policy strength. The prospects for successful implementation will be discussed further in Chapter Seven.
