ABSTRACT
This chapter deals with two research questions. First the conditions are discussed under which politicians are expected to prefer quangos to bureaucracy. Second, conditions are specified that are expected to influence the (in-)efficiency of policy implementation by quangos. The chapter suggests some possible extensions for the theoretical model. Three premises are fundamental to the proposed explanation of quangocratization. The first premise is that macro phenomena can be explained by using certain assumptions about the behaviour of individuals and the conditions/constraints under which they act. In the problem situation at hand, two actors will be distinghuished, who are both considered key actors: the legislature and the executive agent. The second premise is that the behaviour of individuals is rational, that is they pursue goals. The third and final premise concerns the relationship between the two actors specified. It is a principal-agent relationship that is legislature is the principal who charges an executive agent, such as a quango, with policy implementation.
