ABSTRACT
While the BNDSG continued its contentious deliberations over which type of deterrent system would best suit Britain's requirements in the 1970s, the government's overall policy towards the long-term future of the independent nuclear deterrent was a subject of continuing uncertainty during the early months of 1962. In the immediate future, however, the credibility of the deterrent still relied on the supply of Skybolt missiles to Bomber Command's V-force in the mid-1960s, a fact which underlined the uncomfortable point that dependence on the United States for delivery systems could render such long-term problems moot. Meanwhile, the impasse within the BNDSG over size and nature of deterrent capability required during 1970s had, inadvertently, provided a pretext for a reconsideration of the capability and hence size of the currently planned V-bomber force. As the British Government was trying to come to terms with costs associated with maintaining a strategic nuclear capability, the French seemed determined to press ahead almost irrespective of budgetary consequences.
