ABSTRACT
Zimbabwe, like Botswana, inherited from Britain the dualist theory with respect to treaties and monism in relation to customary international law. This chapter examines the post-independence practice in order to find out whether this legacy still obtains. The exercise is undertaken by examining human rights norms embodied in the constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights. The chapter examines how the Zimbabwean courts have treated the subject in practice in the enforcement of human rights norms. It examines whether, and to what extent, the courts have utilised international human rights law and sources in enforcing human rights especially in trying to resolve some of the critical issues that arise in the enforcement process. The main Zimbabwean property clause, Section 16(1), does not employ the language of the international human rights instruments and formulate the individual right to property in positive prescriptive terms. The right to freedom of movement enjoys express constitutional status and recognition in Zimbabwe.
